Incentives play a pivotal role in stimulating user-generated content (UGC), which is critical to the viability and success of today's social computing services. Non-financial social incentives are generally effective in boosting the quantity, but have limited effect on the quality. Conversely, financial incentives generally motivate better quality, but often complicate the efforts to attract quantity. In this paper, we propose knowledge barter-auctioning, a non-financial remunerative mechanism that is particularly effective in stimulating the quality of UGC yet without detriment to its quantity. This mechanism provides an optimal way for the knowledge vendor to choose the best barter partner in order to maximise their expected revenue, which is an extrinsic motivation for the triumph of quality as UGC of higher quality will enable the vendor to attract more bidders and consequently make a higher revenue through the barter auction. We have conducted a series of experiments using a real-world dataset to analyse the ramifications of UGC quality in knowledge bartering processes.
INTRODUCTION
User-generated content (UGC) is the foundation of social computing services like social media, social networking, and question-answering (Q&A). Sustained participation and UGC contributions from users are critical to the viability and success of an online social community [18] . If everyone chose to free-ride on the efforts of others, the community would eventually collapse and the social computing service would cease to exist naturally [24] . Therefore, a healthy online social ecosystem requires an effective incentive mechanism, which needs to consider both intrinsic or extrinsic motivational factors. Intrinsic motivations reflect spontaneous self-satisfaction from one's participation itself rather than its payoff, including enjoyment of altruism [17] , reciprocation [1] , or obligation to contribute [24] . Extrinsic motivations revolve around the payoff for one's participation rather than the participation per se, that is, the expected benefits of contributing are perceived to exceed the cost of making the contribution, including improvement of skills through receiving feedback from others [13] , building up professional reputation within the community [24] , or receiving rewards, which can be either financial [20] or non-financial [9] .
A representative non-financial remunerative mechanism is virtual currency, which has been widely adopted in social media and online social communities for users to purchase virtual goods, virtual friends, or simply information. For example, in Yahoo!Answers, one is rewarded points for their answer acknowledged by the asker, which can be accumulated and redeemed to post their own questions. Virtual currency may have partially tackled the quantity issue by stimulating participants to earn more "virtual money" through making more UGC contributions, but its impact on the quality is questionable because participants can easily accumulate virtual wealth by exploiting the system rather than through the hard work of improving the quality of their contributions.
An example of non-financial remunerative mechanisms addressing the quality issue is social attention stemmed from the theory of social psychology, where a UGC contribution of higher quality is rewarded more exposure or viewer attention. Work has been done to study reasonable allocation of exposure opportunities among users based on their contributions using game-theoretic models [5, 6] . Studies [20] have further shown that social incentives (based on intrinsic and non-financial extrinsic motivational factors) are more effective in boosting the quantity than financial incentives, but the latter exert more positive influences on the quality.
In this paper, we propose knowledge barter-auctioning, a non-financial remunerative incentive mechanism that is particularly effective in stimulating the quality of UGC yet without detriment to its quantity. This mechanism provides an optimal way for the knowledge vendor to choose the best barter partner in order to maximise their expected revenue, an extrinsic motivation for the triumph of quality as UGC of higher quality will enable the vendor to attract more competitors and consequently make a higher revenue through the barter auction. We have conducted a series of experiments using a real-world dataset to analyse the ramifications of UGC quality in knowledge bartering processes.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We first introduce related work in the next section. We then describe the conceptual model followed by the working mechanism of knowledge barter-auctioning. After that, we present a series of experiments and discuss the experimental results. Finally, we conclude the paper with a summary of major contributions and future work.
RELATED WORK
From the economical point of view, knowledge has value and an online social community should be not only a platform for users to create and consume knowledge but also a market for users to trade their knowledge. Knowledge buyers are individuals who try to solve a complex issue that precludes an easy answer and knowledge sellers are those who have a reputation for their substantial knowledge about a subject or process. Knowledge trading in knowledge markets is established on the belief that both buyers and sellers can benefit from exchanging their intellectual properties [15] .
As a representative example of online knowledge markets, online question-answering systems can be categorised into community question-answering services (CQA) and feebased question-answering services. Because knowledge sharing by answering questions is not subsidised in CQA, an incentive mechanism is required to encourage participants to dedicate their efforts to knowledge sharing. Altruism exists to some extent, but it is not always good enough to motivate participants to devote themselves to difficult tasks. Virtual currency is more widely adopted as a non-financial trading model for online knowledge markets, However, as it is a metaphor of real currency, it inevitably inherits most of economic problems such as inflation and deflation [8] as participants can easily accumulate virtual wealth through acts like collusions or sockpuppets.
In recent years, some research has been done to explore motivational factors from social psychology perspectives. High interaction and rating in an online social community generally make participants feel satisfied, thus encouraging them to contribute more and better. Dearman and Truong found that in CQA systems, the most significant reason for a user (not) to answer a question is not the question itself, but the perceived importance of their answer by the asker and the perceived ranking of the answer by all answerers [3] . Social psychological rewards, such as social attention, are not unlimited resources and therefore should be distributed appropriately amongst participants to incentivise desirable behaviours. Game-theoretical approach is considered a good choice for analysing the design of such allocation mechanism [22] . For example, Jain et al. proposed a game-theoretic model of sequential information aggregation motivated by online question-answering forums and investigated the effect of different rules for allocating points on the equilibrium behaviour [9] . A game-theoretical model was also used to analyse the impact of exposing mechanisms like elimination and ranking on the elicitation of high quality contributions as the participation or attention diverged [4] .
As a pioneer of fee-based question-answering services, Google Answers adopted a financial trading model allowing askers to offer bounties to the experts who have provided good answers to their questions. However, financial incentives do not lead to more and sustained user participation. Shah et al. reported that Google Answers did not gain more popularity than its CQA counterpart Yahoo! Answer [21] . Raban analysed two expert subgroups in an online information market and showed that a pure financial incentive serves as enticement, however, social incentives induce persistent participation by experts and eventually lead to higher average economic gains [19] . Furthermore, there is no evidence that questions of higher prices would necessarily receive better answers. Chen et al. observed that offering a higher reward for a question often leads to a significantly longer, but unnecessarily better, answer, while answerers with a higher reputation usually provide significantly better answers [2] . Jeon et al. again concluded that price is a factor in determining whether a question could receive answers, however it does not have a direct effect on the quality of answers [10] .
We want to investigate the quality issue from a different perspective. Increasing the price of a question may not necessarily get a better answer, but a UGC contribution of higher quality should sell for a better price through auctioning, a widely used game-theoretic model. Furthermore, to avoid the ramifications of a financial system, a non-financial payment solution based on knowledge bartering [14] is integrated into the auctioning mechanism, leading to a unique solution referred to as barter-auctioning. The auction theory has been used in many applications such as advertisement positions in web pages [23] . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that combines the auction theory with the bartering economic model to design an incentive mechanism for online knowledge markets. extent because the higher quality a UGC contribution has, the more likely it is accepted as barter, however it has no guarantee that a low quality UGC contribution would never be part of a successful barter transaction and consequently is unable to prevent self-interested users from exploiting the system by bartering their low quality UGC.
The online silk road solution was further proposed to automate knowledge bartering processes in order to maximise the social welfare within an online social community. It adopted a centralised strategy: first generating a complete directed graph representing participants and their supplydemand relationships, then finding potential barter transactions by discovering cycles in the graph, and finally producing all knowledge bartering online silk roads, each consisting of cycles with the maximum cardinality. The ultimate goal was to single out the maximum-weight online silk road consisting of cycles whose length is under a constraint in order to achieve social welfare maximisation, that is, the community as a whole can gain the maximum benefit. 4 from P3 and P4 respectively as a return in the two cycles. Knowledge quality is only used in determining the maximum-weight online silk road but not directly involved in choosing the barter partners, for example, two low quality supplies (P1 → P2) and (P3 → P1) have to be included in the barter transactions.
Built upon the foundation of knowledge bartering for boosting the quantity of UGC contributions and auction as a profound theory in applied economics for selling goods to potential buyers with unknown values [11] , we propose knowledge barter-auctioning to further stimulate the quality of UGC contributions through the following measures.
• It adopts a distributed strategy: no graph needs to be generated, no cycle needs to be discovered, and each barter transaction only involves two parties. The 2-party bartering solution is more efficient and robust than the multi-party one and not susceptible to a single point of failure.
• It does not ask participants to describe their demand requirements; instead each participant only needs to profile their set of interests (SOI) and label each of their UGC contributions with an appropriate SOI. In Figure 
A SOI has a broader coverage than a specific demand, making it possible for more barter opportunities.
• It is based on the assumption that participants are selfinterested. Therefore its primary objective is to maximise individuals' benefits through an optimal auctioning mechanism rather than the social welfare through discovering online silk roads.
For the example in Figure 1 , for P1 to maximise her/his benefit from bartering B k 1 , she/he would need to ensure its quality as a high-quality UGC contribution is likely to attract high-quality bids from the potential competitors P2, P3, and P4 through an auctioning process. If the auction is successful, one of the competitors, for example, P4, will win the barter and consequently P1 will transfer her/his bartering right of B k 1 to P4. For the same token, competitors are also motivated to ensure the quality of their UGC contributions in order to win the bid.
(4)
SOI ( using an extractive summarisation technique [7] and then displays the summary of B based on which they send a barter item of their own as a bid to the trading centre. In this example, the qualified bidders are P2, P3, and P4 whose bids are B 
AN OPTIMAL AUCTION MECHANISM FOR KNOWLEDGE BARTERING
In an open knowledge market, it is reasonable to assume all knowledge owners (vendors or buyers) are selfish, rational, and autonomous, each seeking to maximise their own expected revenue through bartering their knowledge goods. Considering each UGC contribution to be a single indivisible item, a pivotal issue is for the vendor to choose a barter partner from more than one competitor in order to maximise their expected revenue through an auction where the vendor's revenue is determined by competition among the bidders according to the rules set out by the vendor.
Auction Theory
In mechanism deign theory, an auction mechanism has three key elements: a set of bids, an allocation rule, and a payment rule. The allocation and payment rules are both functions of the bids, where the former determines the probability in which each bidder will win the competition, while the latter determines the payment the winner must make. According to the revelation principle of the mechanism design theory [16] , outcomes from any equilibrium are equivalent to a truthful equilibrium of a direct mechanism, where the players report their private values truthfully. Without loss of generality, we only design a direct auction mechanism.
Let V be the vendor of a barter item and C = {Ci | i Consider a direct mechanism (Q, M ) for knowledge barterauctioning, which consists of a pair of functions: Q: χ → ∆ and M : χ → R N , where Qi(x) is the probability in which competitor Ci will win the competition and Mi(x) is the expected payment made by Ci. With the distributions of knowledge quality values from the competitors, given a direct mechanism, denote
the probability in which Ci will win the competition when their reported value is zi and all other competitors report their private values truthfully. Similarly, denote
the expected payment from Ci when their reported value is zi and all other competitors tell the truth. Then Ui(xi), the expected payoff (or utility) for competitor Ci, is the revenue minus the corresponding cost. When Ci's true value is xi, but the reported value is zi, again assuming that all other competitors tell the truth, Ci's utility is expressed as
Apart from the goal of maximising the vendor's revenue, Incentive Compatibility (IC) and Individual Rationality (IR) are two other desired properties.
Definition 1. Incentive Compatibility (IC)
The direct mechanism (Q, M ) is said to be incentive compatible, if for ∀i, Ui(xi) ≡ qi(xi)xi − mi(xi) ≥ qi(zi)xi − mi(zi), where Ci's true and reported values are xi and zi respectively.
We refer to Ui(xi) as the equilibrium payoff function, which can also be expressed as
The IC property is to ensure that rational competitors will prefer telling the truth about their private quality values because it would help increase their expected payoff as compared to not doing so. A competitor's expected payoff in an incentive compatible direct mechanism (Q, M ) depends only on the allocation rule, up to an additive constant.
Definition 2. Individual Rationality (IR)
Assume that by no participation a competitor's payoff is zero. A direct mechanism (Q, M ) is said to be individual rational, if for ∀i, Ui(xi) ≥ 0, where competitor Ci's true value is xi.
If the payment required by an auction mechanism is too high, potential competitors may choose not to participate. The IR property is to ensure rational competitors that they would never be worse off by participating in the auction.
Optimal Auction for Quality-aware Knowledge Bartering
From the game-theoretic point of view, knowledge bartering can be considered a game among the competitors whose bidding strategies are functions of their private value distributions. The game will reach the equilibrium if the players all want to maximise their expected payoff.
In an auction, the vendor's revenue, denoted by R, comes from the payment of all competitors. It is generally the sum of all competitors' payment. Because a UGC contribution is indivisible in knowledge bartering, only one competitor will win it. In a direct mechanism, the expected revenue of the vendor is defined as
An optimal auction mechanism is defined as follows for each vendor to maximise their expected revenue by bartering their UGC contribution with the auction winner.
Definition 3. Optimal Auction Mechanism
A direct mechanism is an optimal auction if the outcome resulted from the mechanism's allocation and payment rules maximises the expected revenue of the vendor under the constraints of incentive compatibility and individual rationality.
Specifically, an optimal auction mechanism needs to define the allocation and payment rules in order to solve the following problem:
In a direct mechanism (Q, M ), the ex ante expected payment of competitor Ci is
This optimisation problem can be further clarified by defining virtual valuation of private value.
Definition 4. Virtual valuation
The virtual valuation of competitor Ci is ψi(.
The auction problem is said to be regular if for ∀i, ψi(.) is an increasing function of the true value xi. In the remainder of the paper, we assume the auction problem is regular. Then Equation 5 can be reformulated as
by using the definition of qi(xi) from Equation 1 and ψi(.) from Definition 4.
So the vendor's objective is to design a direct mechanism so as to maximise
while satisfying the constraints of incentive compatibility and individual rationality. As mi(0) is a constant, maximising i∈N ψi(xi)Qi(x) will maximise Equation 6.
Vickrey -Clarke -Groves (VCG) [11] is an efficient auction mechanism that can maximise social surplus of the bidders' set, that is i∈N xiQi(x). Considering i∈N ψi(xi)Qi(x) to be the virtual social surplus, that is the social surplus comprised of virtual private quality values, we design the Knowledge Optimal Barter-Auction (KOBA) algorithm based on VCG in order to achieve maximisation of virtual social surplus, which is illustrated by Algorithm 1. 
c. Derive the allocation and payment rules:
Because there is only one indivisible barter item for auction in every knowledge trading process using KOBA, the mechanism can actually be reduced to a second price auction. Let yi(x¬i) = inf{zi: ψi(zi) ≥ 0 ∧ ∀j = i, ψi(zi) ≥ ψj(xj)}, which is the minimum private quality value corresponding to the non-negative virtual value that can win the auction. The allocation and payment rules in Algorithm 1 can be reformulated as
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
The goal of conducting experiments is to test the feasibility and also measure the performance of the knowledge barter-auctioning solution using a real-world dataset. Because there is no system that adopts knowledge barter auctioning, we collected real data from a question-answering system Yahoo!Answers to simulate a knowledge market underpinned by the barter-auctioning mechanism. We are conscious that the system actually adopts a remunerative incentive mechanism based on virtual currency. We only used their answers and the associated questions as UGC contributions to simulate knowledge barter-auctioning, that is, participants barter auction knowledge items that each comprises an answer and the corresponding question.
Data Collection and Experimental Design
To best simulate the environment where participants interact in a knowledge market, our experimental dataset was collected from Yahoo!Answers New Zealand using open APIs to retrieve the questions and answers in different categories. We collected 92, 112 questions each with at least one answer in the period from April 2008 to March 2011. There are 26 top-level categories and each category was treated as an interest in our experiments. Two participants have overlapping sets of interests if they have knowledge items falling into each other's SOI. By applying this rule, we obtained hundreds of potential trading groups, each consisting of one vendor and tens of competitors, as illustrated by Figure 2 . The number of trading groups and the size of each trading group can be scaled up/down by adjusting the each participant's SOI. Furthermore, we need to measure the knowledge quality as it is the pivot of the allocation and payment rules in the knowledge barter-auctioning solution. As a proof of concept, we measured the quality of a knowledge item based on the relevance of the answer to the question using Kullback-Leibler divergence [12] in our experiments.
Experiments were designed to compare the vendor's expected revenue between the quality-aware knowledge barterauctioning mechanism and a quality-unaware knowledge bartering mechanism. Additional experiments were also designed to compare the performance of the two mechanisms, including how the quality of bids affects the competitors' winning probability and how the number of competitors affects the vendor's expected revenue.
Estimation of Private Quality Value Distributions
In a quality-unaware knowledge bartering process [14] , quality is only factored in the derivation of the edge weight representing a supply-demand relationship but not in the selection of barter partners. A low quality supply would still be bartered if it were an indispensable constituent of the maximum-weight online silk road that achieves social welfare maximisation. Therefore, the probability of a UGC contribution being successfully bartered is essentially independent of its quality. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity yet without losing generality, random selection of a barter partner is used in a quality-unaware knowledge bartering process in our experiments and such mechanism is referred to as Quality-Unaware Random Bartering (QURB).
Conversely, in a quality-aware knowledge barter-auctioning process consisting of vendor V who wants to barter auction their knowledge B V and N competitors {Ci | i = 1, 2, · · · , N } who can offer an exchange in V 's set of interests. Let q V i denote competitor Ci's private quality value estimate towards B V and BSi = {B 
In a Bayesian optimal auction, probability distributions of private values are assumed common knowledge for both the vendor and the competitors and the probability density functions should be monotonically increasing to satisfy the regularity requirement. Many functions, such as uniform distributions, exponential distributions and normal distributions, satisfy this requirement. For the sake of simplicity yet without losing generality, we use an exponential distribution f (x) = x θ as the probability density function for all competitors in our experiments. It is clear that f (x) is regular when θ > 1 and partially regular when 0 < θ < 1. As such we generate different sets of private quality value distributions by random selection of θ.
Vendor's expected revenue in relation to the private quality value distributions of the bids
This experiment tests how the private quality value distributions of the bids affect the vendor's expected revenue using QURB and KOBA respectively. We randomly selected 30 trading groups from the collected dataset, each consisting of a vendor and up to 15 competitors who were randomly chosen from all qualified bidders and assigned different private quality value distributions for their bids. For each trading group, we recorded the vendor's expected revenue, which is the quality value of the winning barter, using 3 different sets of private quality value distributions, referred to as PQVDS-1, PQVDS-2, and PQVDS-3 respectively, as shown in Figure 3 , 4, and 5 respectively.
It is clear that the vendor's expected revenue fluctuates with the quality of bids using both QURB and KOBA, however KOBA is less sensitive to the changes of quality of bids. More importantly, the average revenue using KOBA is significantly higher than that using QURB. This result is independent of the private quality value distribution sets.
Vendor's expected revenue in relation to the number of competitors
This experiment tests how the number of competitors in a trading group affects the vendor's expected revenue using QURB and KOBA respectively. We randomly selected 30 trading groups from the collected dataset, each consisting of a vendor and a varying number of competitors who were randomly chosen from all qualified bidders and assigned different private quality value distributions for their bids. The number of competitors in each group was set to 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 in 6 tests. We recorded the vendor's expected revenue in each trading group for each of the 6 tests and then computed the average expected revenue. It is clear from Figure 6 that with the increase of the number of competitors, the expected revenue obtained by KOBA is approaching the optimum of 1.0, which confirms the theoretical result of auction theory. In contrast, the expected revenue obtained by QURB is independent of the number of competitors. Figure 6 again confirms the result in the first experiment that the average expected revenue obtained by KOBA is much higher than that by QURB.
Competitors' winning probability in relation to
bids' private quality value distributions
This experiment tests how the private quality value distributions of the bids affect competitors's winning probability using QURB and KOBA respectively. We randomly selected 100 trading groups from the collected dataset, each consisting of a vendor and up to 15 competitors who were randomly chosen from all qualified bidders and assigned different private quality value distributions for their bids. For each trading group, we recorded the quality of bids from all competitors and computed the percentage of winning in different quality intervals accordingly using 3 different sets of private quality value distributions of PQVDS-1, PQVDS-2, and PQVDS-3, as shown in Figure 7 , 8, and 9 respectively. It is clear that the quality of bids has no direct impact on the competitors' winning probability using QURB, which is constantly low. In contrast, the quality of bids plays a pivotal role in winning the auction using KOBA, where bids of higher quality obviously have a higher winning probability and a mild improvement of quality can dramatically increase the winning probability. This result is independent of the private quality value distribution sets.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented knowledge barter-auctioning as an alternative non-financial incentive mechanism, in which bartering is used to motivate quantity and auctioning is used to stimulate quality. It provides an optimal way for the vendor to choose the best barter partner in order to maximise their expected revenue. A UGC contribution of higher quality will enable the vendor to attract more competitors and consequently make a higher revenue through auctioning. Competitors are equally motivated to offer their own high-quality UGC contributions to barter with the vendor because the higher quality of the bid a competitor offers, the more likely they will win the auction. Experimental results have confirmed the ramifications of UGC quality in knowledge bartering processes.
While this work has shown promising results, we are conscious that it is non-trivial to choose an appropriate private quality value distribution in practice. Therefore, an imminent task is to devise an optimal auction algorithm that does not require prior knowledge of private quality value distributions. We will work on a quality evaluation strategy that takes into account more factors than only the relevance. We will need to design and conduct experiments to compare knowledge barter-auctioning with other non-financial incentive mechanisms such as the virtual currency.
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